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Abstract 
Nigeria contains some of Africa’s oldest and newest cities, hosts five of the 30 largest urban 
settlements on the continent, and is estimated to have the biggest urban population on the 
continent. Yet many of the basic ‘facts’ about spatial-demographic trends in Nigeria have 
been contested. Most recently, an article published in World Development in 2012 claimed 
that urbanization had stalled in Nigeria. In an effort to establish and explain the stylized 
facts of Nigeria’s urban transition we analyze demographic and spatial trends drawing on 
diverse sources, including censuses, household surveys, remotely sensed data, and 
migration studies conducted over the past three decades. The evidence does not support 
the claim of stalled urbanization: Nigeria’s urban population is growing rapidly in absolute 
terms and will continue to increase as a share of the national population due both to rural-
urban migration and rural transformation. These drivers of urbanization are a product of 
persistently high fertility in a context of declining mortality in both rural and urban areas. 
Robust economic growth over the past decade likely accelerated urbanization, but even as 
the economy slows demographic fundamentals will continue to drive rapid urban growth 
and urbanization.  
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Introduction 
 
Nigeria contains some of Africa’s oldest and newest cities (e.g. Kano and Abuja), hosts five 
of the continent’s 30 largest cities, and is estimated to have the biggest urban population on 
the continent (UN 2014). According to UN figures just under 50 percent of Nigeria’s 
population now live in urban areas and this proportion is projected to reach 67 percent by 
2050 (ibid). Nigeria has emerged as Africa’s urban giant. 
 
Yet many of the basic ‘facts’ about spatial-demographic trends in Nigeria have been 
contested, and population statistics have been highly politicized in the country since 
independence. Most recently, an article published in World Development asserted that 
“There can be no doubt…that the level [of urbanization in Nigeria] has been overestimated” 
(Potts 2012, 1386) and that the evidence “is overwhelmingly in favour of the interpretation 
that urbanization in Nigeria has slowed dramatically” (ibid, 1388).  More boldly, it was 
claimed that “it is surely now undeniable that…the shift from rural to urban in this part of 
the world has usually become very gradual or stagnant or, in some cases, reversed” (ibid, 
1386). 
 
These claims have very significant implications for how policymakers frame development 
challenges and choose to allocate resources. It is therefore important to interrogate their 
validity. 
 
In this paper we investigate the evidence and sketch out the stylized facts of urban 
transformation in Nigeria by drawing on diverse sources, including censuses, household 
surveys, remotely sensed data, and migration studies conducted over the past three 
decades.  
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We find that recent suggestions of stalled urbanization in the country are not supported by 
the evidence presented here. Nigeria’s urban population is growing rapidly in absolute 
terms and will continue to increase as a share of the national population due both to rural-
urban migration and rural transformation. Both of these drivers of urbanization are a 
product of persistently high fertility in a context of declining mortality in rural and urban 
areas. Robust economic growth over the past decade likely accelerated urbanization, but 
even as the economy slows demographic fundamentals will continue to drive urbanization.  
 
The claim that urbanization has stalled is not only empirically incorrect, it is based on 
problematic conceptualisation of urbanization as an intrinsically economic process. While 
economic change and urban change are often intertwined, demographic forces rather than 
economic ones have likely played a more significant role in shaping Africa’s urban transition 
over the past three decades. Population growth in urban areas has been fast and rural 
population growth generates more potential migrants. Some move seeking employment 
opportunities, but according to the data many do not. Moreover, the scale of rural 
transformation in Nigeria has likely been underappreciated as a source of urbanization and 
urban growth. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we review key definitions and 
measurement issues associated with understanding spatial-demographic trends in general, 
and then highlight the particularly politicised nature of population data in Nigeria. The 
subsequent two sections present the stylized facts around trends in urbanization, urban 
growth, urban expansion and the evolution of Nigeria’s urban system since independence. 
This is followed by an analysis of drivers, including demographic change and migration, and 
some tentative predictions for the short to medium term. 
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1. Definitions, measurement and data politics 
The word ‘urbanization’ is often used as a catch-all term for three related but distinct 
processes: urbanization, urban growth and urban expansion (Fox and Goodfellow 2016; Fox 
and Bell 2016). Conflating these processes is analytically problematic and can lead to 
confusion about what is actually happening, and, by extension, what appropriate policy 
responses might be (ibid; see also Fox 2014). 
 
The term ‘urbanization’ is used here to refer specifically to an increase in the proportion of 
a country or region’s population residing in urban settlements, while ‘urban growth’ refers to 
an increase in the absolute size of a country or region’s urban population. These terms are 
frequently used interchangeably in both academic and policy circles, but it is particularly 
important to recognize the difference between them in the context of sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) where urban population growth rates are generally high but overall urbanization 
rates have often been relatively low (Fox 2012; Potts 2012).   This has important policy 
implications which will be discussed below.  
 
We use the term ‘urban expansion’ to indicate the spatial or physical enlargement of built-
up areas. This generally accompanies urban growth, but the dynamics of urban expansion 
also depend upon the nature of physical developments and the population densities they 
promote. It is possible, for example, for a city to experience urban growth without expansion 
if this growth is absorbed within existing settlement boundaries, resulting in higher 
population density. Conversely, expansion can occur without growth where new 
developments are created to facilitate lower population densities for an existing 
community. 
 
To complicate matters there is no consensus on what constitutes an ‘urban’ area as opposed 
to a rural settlement. Broadly speaking, urban settlements are defined as demographically 
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large, relatively densely populated, built-up areas (Fox and Goodfellow 2016). In practice, 
countries classify settlements for enumeration purposes using a variety of criteria—there 
is no universal standard. Considerations include population size, density, administrative 
status and employment composition, amongst others; this complicates direct comparisons 
between countries (Satterthwaite 2007). In Nigeria a settlement is classified as urban if it 
contains 20,000 people or more, which is a relatively high minimum population threshold 
compared to many other countries. Some of the data we use below is based on this 
threshold; other sources use alternative criteria. We note the differences in the underlying 
definition of ‘urban’ where significant. 
 
With regard to monitoring urban change processes there are essentially three fundamental 
sources of quantitative data on urban population and urban settlement characteristics: 
population censuses, household surveys, and remotely sensed data (e.g. aerial 
photography). All credible published estimates and projections can generally be traced back 
to one or more of these sources. 
 
Census data has historically been considered to be the ‘gold standard’ of demographic 
sources. In principle, census exercises provide a relatively fine-grained statistical portrait 
of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of a population on a periodic basis, 
usually every 10 years. This facilitates effective public policy planning and implementation. 
In practice, censuses in Africa vary considerably in frequency, coverage and quality.  
 
Census data are also a key source underpinning the widely used United Nations 
demographic statistics. Where census data are limited or unavailable, other data are 
employed to inform models which are used to interpolate figures for incomplete series and 
project population counts into the future. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa many 
published estimates are based on a combination of available census data and data from 
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sample surveys conducted by independent agencies which contain information useful for 
modelling population dynamics (such as fertility and mortality rates).  
 
In the case of Nigeria, the most recent urban population estimates from the UN (published 
in 2014) have been derived from the 1963, 1991 and 2006 censuses, as well as a variety of 
household surveys including the Demographic Health Survey (DHS) and the Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) (UN 2014). According to the UN methodology, and 
following the convention in Nigeria, settlements with a population of 20,000 or more are 
classified as urban. All state capitals are included. 
 
Critics of the UN data point out that the published data series appear misleadingly complete 
and apparently comparable when in fact the quality of the data underpinning them varies 
wildly and national statistics agencies use very different definitions when classifying 
populations as ‘rural’ or ‘urban’ (Cohen 2004; Satterthwaite 2007). Nevertheless, UN 
statistics represent the best efforts of professional demographers to estimate and project 
national and sub-national population trends with available data and are certainly useful in 
identifying trends over time—particularly within individual countries.  
 
While UN figures are useful at the macro (i.e. national) level, margins of error increase 
significantly when it comes to estimates of individual settlements, where urban boundary 
definitions and the quality of underlying census data make a significant difference.  
 
For example, according to the latest UN figures the population of Lagos State was roughly 
8.86 million in 2005 (UN 2014). This is close to the estimate provided by the federal 
government’s National Population Commission (NPC) census estimate of 9.1 million in 
2006. However, the Lagos State Government claimed there were 17.5 million people living 
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in the state in 2006, based upon an independently conducted parallel census in that year 
and corroborated by a mass immunization programme.  
 
However, the boundaries of the state of Lagos do not neatly correspond to the built up area 
of the city. Thomas Brinkhoff of citypopulation.de therefore provides an alternative 
estimate for metropolitan Lagos using the Lagos State Bureaus of Statistics population data 
with the city boundaries defined by the 16 contiguous Local Government Areas (LGAs) that 
contain the built-up area of the city. (LGAs are the smallest geographically-defined tiers of 
administration in Nigeria.)  This approach yields a population estimate of roughly 16 million 
in 2006. Yet this estimate does not include large areas of the city that are clearly part of the 
continuous built up area of the city but happen to fall inside neighboring Ogun State.  
 
There is now a fourth estimate that does factor these areas in from the Africapolis project, 
which estimates the population of greater Lagos to be 10.6 million in 2010. Yet even this 
estimate excludes areas that are technically separate but are arguably part of the functional 
area of metropolitan Lagos, such as Ikorodu in the east and Magbon in the west. In short, 
the ‘true’ size of Lagos remains contested due to disputes about the integrity of survey 
estimates and a lack of consensus on how to appropriately define the boundaries of the city.  
 
However, the Africapolis estimates are a step in the right direction and reflect the 
emergence of a new resource for monitoring urban change: geospatial datasets which 
integrate various types of remotely sensed data (e.g. aerial photography and satellite 
imagery) with census data and novel modeling techniques. Proponents claim that remotely 
sensed data can be used to derive estimates of the size of built-up areas that is based on a 
“more precise, consistent and comparable definition of an urban area than notions such as 
population thresholds or administrative boundaries” (Linard, Tatem and Gilbert 2013, 23). 
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The most notable examples include the Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project (GRUMP), the 
Atlas of Urban Expansion (Angel 2012), the WorldPop project and Africapolis itself.  
 
These datasets are particularly useful for monitoring urban expansion by providing 
information on land cover changes gleaned from satellite images. For example, the GRUMP 
dataset draws on composite images of night-time lights on cloudless nights taken by US 
Defense Department meteorological satellites; WorldPop employs land cover data from the 
European Space Agency’s GlobCover project; and Africapolis relies primarily on Google 
Earth images supplemented with those available from the US Geological Survey. In each 
case, the visual information from satellites has been processed to distinguish between built-
up (i.e. urban) areas and natural landscapes, resulting in an estimate of the land area 
covered by human settlements. 
 
The datasets can also be used to cross-validate population estimates where habitation 
densities can be accurately calculated. However, it is important to note that population 
estimates drawn from geospatial datasets are ultimately informed by census data. While 
land cover data can help to refine estimates of urban population size (e.g. reveal gross 
discrepancies between reported and actual habitation densities), they should not be 
interpreted as wholly independent sources of population data given that they rely on census 
data and projections for population counts. Without this, remotely sensed data alone can be 
misleading. For example, night-time lights data can significantly underestimate population 
size and density in areas lacking energy infrastructure. 
 
In sum, there are a variety of sources we can draw upon to assess patterns of urban change, 
but there are inherent difficulties in sub-Saharan Africa due to the paucity of reliable census 
data and the current limitations of remotely sensed data. In Nigeria, a patchy record of data 
collection has been compounded by politically motivated manipulation of population 
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statistics. The politics of population data in Nigeria is directly linked to the way in which 
these data are used to determine the allocation of fiscal resources in the country, and the 
tenuous political settlement that binds together an ethnically and religiously diverse society 
(Robinson 2012; Potts 2012). These factors provide strong incentives for local officials to 
inflate the apparent size of their communities at state level, by ethnic group and even by 
religion (Population Council 2007; Potts 2012).  
 
As a result of the propensity for over-counting in the country, the quality of census data is 
not considered to be very good. The first post-independence census in 1963 is widely 
considered to be a product of political negotiation between states rather than an accurate 
count; the results of a subsequent census in 1973 were suppressed (ibid). The next census 
held in 1991 is generally believed to be credible as is the most recent in 2006; both excluded 
questions about ethnicity and religion (see Population Council 2007; Moriconi-Ebrard, 
Harre and Heinrigs 2016). However, since all states have an incentive to inflate estimates it 
is believed that national population figures are inflated (ibid). Nevertheless, this lack of 
precision does not necessarily preclude identifying broad trends over time. 
 
2. Some stylized facts about Nigeria’s urban transformation 
One way of compensating for questionable census statistics is to combine information from 
multiple sources. This approach increases confidence in the broad stylized facts concerning 
the dynamics of Nigeria’s urban transition. 
 
2.1 Urban growth and urbanization 
Even with a wide margin of error in census figures, there is no doubt that Nigeria’s urban 
population has expanded rapidly over the past 50 years and will continue to grow relatively 
fast in the coming decades, although how fast is a matter of some dispute. Table 1 
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summarizes urban population trends from three data sources: available censuses (1952, 
1963, 1991), the United Nations (which incorporates data from the 2006 census) and 
Africapolis, which combines census data with geospatial analysis.  
 
All three sources show a 10-fold increase in the size of Nigeria’s urban population between 
1950 and 1990 (from around 3 million to just over 30 million). The 2006 census estimate 
of the nation’s urban population is not publicly available, but the UN and Africapolis figures 
(both of which cite the 2006 census) suggest that the urban population reached about 50 
million by the year 2000 and 77 million in 2010.  
 
Table 1. Urbanization and Urban Growth in Nigeria, 1950-2010 
 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
  
 
Urban population (millions) 
UN 3.88 7.42 13.02 21.59 34.42 52.38 77.63 
Africapolis 3.62 8.40 12.44 20.22 32.73 48.41 76.42 
Census* 3.10 8.97   32.29   
        
 
Level of urbanization (%) 
UN 10.2 16.2 22.7 28.6 35.3 42.4 49.0 
Africapolis 9.6 18.6 22.2 27.4 34.2 39.4 47.9 
Census* 10.2 16.1   36.3   
Notes: *Census estimates are from the years 1952, 1963 and 1991 respectively. 
 
Similarly, all three sources indicate that the level of urbanization in Nigeria—i.e.  the 
percentage of the total population residing in urban settlements—grew from roughly 10 
percent in 1950 to 35 percent in 1990. The UN and final Africapolis estimates for 2010 agree 
on a rate of between 48 and 49 percent (see Table 1). 
 
It is important to highlight the similarity of these figures from diverse sources because 
differences between them have been used in the past to argue that the level of urbanization 
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in Nigeria has been overestimated (see Potts 2012). However, large differences between 
draft estimates by Africapolis (2008) and UN figures have largely been eliminated in the 
most recent Africapolis estimates (Moriconi-Ebrard, Harre and Heinrigs 2016).  These 
revised estimates were informed by more data, improved satellite imagery and the 
identification of previously overlooked yet very large urban centers (e.g. Onitsha). 
 
The current estimates therefore clearly contradict the assessment that urbanization has 
‘stalled’ in Nigeria, as suggested by Potts (2012), whose analysis placed heavy emphasis on 
the economic dimensions of urbanization and downplayed the non-economic forces that 
can serve to drive the process forward even in the face of economic crisis (see Fox 2012).  
 
Nevertheless, the new Africapolis data do indicate that rates of urban population growth 
and urbanization have fluctuated considerably over the past 70 years, and this variability 
may very well reflect economic (and political) trends. Table 2 compares urban growth and 
urbanization rates calculated from UN and Africapolis data. The UN data shows very high 
but steadily declining rates of urban growth between 1950 and 2010, while the Africapolis 
data suggest more volatility, with extremely rapid growth in the 1950s, and high growth 
after with noticeable slowdowns in the 1960s and 1990s. These same trends are evident in 
rates of urbanization across the decades as well. 
 
Table 2. Average annual growth rates of urban population & urbanization in Nigeria 
 
1950-
1960 
1960-
1970 
1970-
1980 
1980-
1990 
1990-
2000 
2000-
2010 
  
 
Urban population growth rate 
UN 6.52 5.62 5.06 4.66 4.20 3.93 
Africapolis 8.41 3.92 4.86 4.81 3.91 4.57 
       
 
Urbanization rate 
UN 4.63 3.37 2.31 2.10 1.83 1.45 
Africapolis 6.61 1.77 2.10 2.22 1.42 1.95 
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The Africapolis data also include useful estimates of population change for individual 
settlements within Nigeria between 1950 and 2010. A simple tabulation of changes in the 
number of settlements by size class reveals the extent to which rural transformation has 
contributed to urban growth and urbanization in the country—a dynamic that is often 
overlooked and impossible to identify from data aggregated at national level. As Table 3 
shows, the number of settlements in Nigeria with a population of 5,000 or more has grown 
from 174 in 1950 to 1197 in 2010. If we use the population threshold definition for an urban 
settlement employed by the Nigerian government (20,000), the number has grown over 10-
fold, from 50 to 536. 
 
 
Table 3. Number of urban settlements in Nigeria by size class, 1960-2010  
 
20,000+ 
10,000-
20,000 
5,000-
10,000 
Total 
1950 50 49 75 174 
1970 135 175 82 392 
1990 280 304 462 1046 
2010 536 484 177 1197 
Source: Africapolis (2015) 
 
 
In sum, data from multiple sources indicate that Nigeria’s urban population has grown 
rapidly in both absolute and relative terms over the past 75 years, and there is no indication 
that this growth will cease in the near future. Indeed, after a slowdown in the 1990s, rates 
of urban growth and urbanization accelerated between 2000 and 2010. A potential 
explanation for this is provided in our analysis of drivers below. 
 
 
 
13 
 
2.2 Urban expansion and the evolution of the urban system 
The growth of Nigeria’s urban population in both absolute and relative terms has naturally 
been accompanied by the expansion of existing built-up areas and, as noted above, the 
emergence of new identifiably ‘urban’ settlements. Overall, the physical expansion of built-
up areas is expected to continue in the coming decades, although there is considerable 
uncertainty about how much expansion will take place. The key variables are population 
growth and, critically, population density.  
 
As Table 4 shows, an estimated 464,192 hectares of land was covered by large urban 
settlements in 2000. Assuming that urban population densities remain constant, urban land 
cover is expected to triple by 2030; assuming a 2% decline in urban population density as 
urban population grows, urban land cover is forecasted to grow five-fold, reaching roughly 
2.3 million hectares. It is impossible to predict how population densities will change, but in 
general rates of urban expansion have exceeded rates of urban population growth in West 
Africa (Angel 2012). If this precedent holds, it is likely that population densities will decline 
somewhat resulting in greater physical expansion, although there are reasons to expect 
significant differences in patterns of densification between northern and southern regions 
(see below).   
 
Table 4. Urban land cover estimates and projections 
Urban land 
cover in 2000 
(hectares) 
Assumed 
annual density 
decline (%) 
Projected 
urban land 
cover in 2030 
(hectares) 
Percentage 
change, 
2000-2030 
464,192 
0 1,262,215 172 
1 1,703,812 267 
2 2,299,905 395 
Source: Angel (2012) 
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The broad contours of expansion trends and the evolution of Nigeria’s urban system are 
illustrated in Figure 1, which uses the WorldPop dataset (which combines imagery and 
population density data) to map population density at a resolution of 1km2. Population 
density is mapped according to a 3-tiered classification: 0-150 people per km2 (p/km2), 151-
300 p/km2 and 301+ p/km2. These thresholds were chosen based on precedents set by the 
World Bank and Eurostat: the former employ a minimum population density of 150 p/km2 
for their Agglomeration Index (Uchida 2010) while Eurostat uses a minimum density 
threshold of 300 p/km2 to classify an urban area (Eurostat n.d.). 
 
The map, which is consistent with similar analyses of data from Bloch et al (2015) indicates 
that the most extensive urban expansion has been concentrated around four urban ‘fields’—
i.e. regions characterized by one or more metropolitan centers connected to secondary 
cities and towns interspersed with rural settlements (Friedmann and Miller 1965). These 
include a Northern field centered around Kano and encompassing Kaduna in the south and 
Katsina in the North; an emergent Central field running from Abuja in the south-west to Jos 
in the north-east; a Southwestern field stretching from Lagos in the south to Ilorin in the 
north; and a Southeastern field within a roughly square zone encompassing Benin City, Port 
Harcourt, Calabar and Enugu. 
 
Of these, the Northern conurbation around Kano is forecast to experience the most rapid 
physical expansion in coming decades and ranks among the top five most rapidly expanding 
settled regions in all of Africa (Seto, Güneralp and Hutyra 2012). Similar maps derived from 
alternative data sources for the years 1990, 2000 and 2006 confirm the overall pattern of 
four major urban fields in Nigeria (see Bloch et al 2015). 
 
Apart from illustrating the geography of major urban fields in Nigeria, the map also show 
that the country has a fairly balanced ‘urban system’—i.e. the distribution of population 
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across urban settlements. A country is considered to have a highly ‘concentrated’ or 
‘primate’ urban system when a large, single city dominates (i.e., it is significantly more than 
twice the size of the second largest city in the territory).  
 
 
While there is a widely held perception that Lagos is an over-bearing mega-city within the 
urban system, Nigeria’s urban population is in fact spread fairly evenly across these four 
large conurbations. Indeed, in contrast to many African countries Nigeria has historically 
exhibited a relatively ‘balanced’ urban system. In 1952 the country’s settlement distribution 
was very even, with Ibadan holding the position of largest city. By 1991, Lagos had emerged 
as the largest settlement but the rank-size distribution of settlements remained even; by 
2006 Kano surpassed Ibadan to become the largest city after Lagos (see Bloch et al 2015). 
Similarly, according to Africapolis estimates shown in Table 5, Nigeria had the second 
lowest level of urban primacy in West Africa in 2010. Although this simple measure does 
not reflect the structure of the urban system more broadly, it does suggest that Lagos is not 
necessarily an overbearing giant in Nigeria’s urban system. 
 
If the upper-bound estimates of metropolitan Lagos are used instead of the more 
conservative ones published by the UN, NPC and Africapolis (see above), then Nigeria’s 
primacy score would increase somewhat (up to perhaps 3.5 depending on the exact figures 
used), but it would still exhibit one of the least concentrated urban systems in West Africa. 
 
 
Moreover, Lagos appears to be growing more slowly than other large and medium-sized 
cities in the country, which is likely to mitigate the city’s demographic dominance in coming 
decades. Calculations based on UN population estimates suggest that population growth in 
large second tier cities such as Abuja, Benin City and Port Harcourt will outpace that of 
Figure 1. People per square kilometre in 2014 & emergent urban fields 
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Lagos between 2010 and 2020, while Kano and Ibadan are likely to roughly match the 
growth of the commercial capital. In sum, Nigeria’s urban landscape is changing fast, but the 
urban system has been and will likely remain relatively balanced in comparative terms. 
 
Table 5. Urban primacy scores for West African countries 
 
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Liberia 7.1 10.2 14.8 21.8 25.7 
Togo 7.1 8.9 10.3 9.5 11 
Mali 5.6 6.8 8.1 8.2 9.4 
Guinea 7.3 9.7 10.2 9.8 8.5 
Mauritania 1.6 6.3 6.8 7.7 8.5 
Guinea-Bissau - 8.4 10.9 15.6 7.5 
The Gambia - 2 4.8 7 7.2 
Chad 4 5.1 5.3 6 7 
Cote d'Ivoire 4.7 5.6 5.9 6.4 6.7 
Niger 2.7 3.7 3.4 4 5.6 
Sierra Leone 5.5 4.6 6.3 6.2 5.5 
Senegal 6.2 7.2 8.7 5.9 3.7 
Burkina Faso 1.5 1.7 2.1 2.6 3.4 
Benin 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.7 2.4 
Cabo Verde 1.3 1 1.3 1.5 1.9 
Nigeria 1.9 2.4 3 3.5 1.7 
Ghana 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.6 
Source: Africapolis/e-Geopolis, SWAC/OECD (2016). Primacy score = 
population of largest city divided by the population of the second largest city. 
 
 
3. Analysis of drivers 
Accounting for these trends and patterns requires an appreciation of economic, 
demographic and social underpinnings of population growth and mobility at national and 
subnational levels. Past research has largely been framed within the dual economy model 
of urbanization first formulated by Lewis (1954) and has mostly ignored critical 
demographic and social factors that influence urban change processes. As a result, much of 
this analysis has failed to adequately explain observed trends (e.g. Fay and Opal 2000; see 
Lall, Selod and Shalizi 2006 and Fox 2012).  In the case of Nigeria, a narrow focus on the 
economic dimension of urbanization partly accounts for the spurious conclusion that 
urbanization has stalled in the country.  
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3.1 The demographic foundations of urban growth and expansion 
The underlying cause of rapid urban growth and expansion in Nigeria is rapid population 
growth driven by declining mortality and persistently high fertility. This is illustrated in 
Table 6, which summarises fertility and child mortality rates over five rounds of 
Demographic and Health Surveys in the country between 1990 and 2013. Although it is not 
possible to derive direct estimates of population growth from these series as the indicators 
are not strictly comparable, an analysis of overall trends between 1990 and 2013 clearly 
shows that mortality decline has outpaced fertility decline by a wide margin. 
 
Table 6. Fertility and child mortality trends in Nigeria, 1990-2013 
 1990 1999 2003 2008 2013 
% ∆ 
1990-2013 
Total Fertility Rate 6.0 4.7 5.7 5.7 5.5 -8.3 
Under-5 mortality rate 191 133 217 171 144 -24.6 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, ICF International 
 
The resultant population boom has driven urban growth and expansion directly through (a) 
natural population increase in existing urban centers, and (b) densification in rural areas 
resulting in the reclassification of settlements from rural to urban. Indirectly, rapid 
population growth in rural areas expands the pool of potential urban migrants and may, 
through demographic pressure on natural resources, contribute to the ‘push’ factors that 
can stimulate rural out-migration (Fox 2012). While rural-urban migration contributes to 
urban growth (see below), the significance of urban natural increase and reclassification 
due to rural densification have been widely underappreciated while the role of rural-urban 
migration has likely been overstated in Nigeria, and indeed in sub-Saharan Africa more 
generally (de Brauw, Mueller and Lee 2014; Jedwab, Christaensen and Gindelsky 2014; Fox 
2017). 
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Fertility rates (and hence population growth rates) have historically tended to be lower in 
urban areas than rural areas (McNicoll 2011). However, in many developing countries in 
the post-war era urban fertility rates have remained relatively high while mortality rates 
have fallen creating an ‘urban push’ – i.e. a rapid, internally generated increase in urban 
population size (Jedwab, Christiaensen and Gindelsky 2014). As a result, urban growth in 
many developing countries has been driven more by urban natural increase than rural-
urban migration (ibid; see also Fox 2012). 
 
Although there is insufficient data to accurately determine the relative contributions of 
natural increase, reclassification and migration to urban growth and expansion in Nigeria, 
data on fertility and mortality trends in rural and urban areas is consistent with the 
hypothesis that urban natural increase plays a significant (and possibly dominant) role in 
driving urban growth. 
 
Figure 2 shows trends in fertility and child mortality rates broken down by rural and urban 
residence between 1990 and 2013 drawing on DHS data. All indicators have been converted 
to index numbers to facilitate comparison of trend rates. In all areas, fertility and mortality 
declined between 1990 and 1999, increased sharply between 1999 and 2003 (for reasons 
that are not entirely clear) and have subsequently fallen. However, child mortality has fallen 
much faster than fertility since 2003. In urban areas, the average fertility rate of 4.7 is high 
and remained unchanged between 2008 and 2013. In other words, urban fertility decline 
appears to have stalled in Nigeria, somewhat contrary even to recent predictions (see 
McNicoll 2011), while urban mortality rates have plummeted. On current trends, urban 
natural increase can thus be expected to accelerate and contribute significantly to urban 
population growth and urban expansion in the near future. 
 
Figure 2. Trends in fertility and mortality by urban and rural residence 
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The trends evident in this figure also provide a possible explanation for those seen in the 
Africapolis data summarized in Table 2 above, which showed an acute deceleration of 
urbanization and urban growth in the 1990s and then an uptick in the first decade of the 
new millennium. In the former period, fertility was falling rapidly, while in the later it rose 
again. 
 
Just as the role of urban natural increase has often been overlooked in analyses of urban 
transitions, so too has the significance of rural transformation (Fox 2017). The process of 
urbanization is generally conceptualised, and seen in the public imagination, as one in which 
people migrate from rural areas into existing towns and cities in search of opportunity. 
What is often overlooked is the enormous increase in the number of identifiably urban 
settlements that have emerged in previously rural landscapes in developing regions in 
recent decades, including in sub-Saharan Africa. As shown in Table 3 above, the number of 
settlements with a population of 5,000 or more in Nigeria increased nearly 10-fold. The 
smaller of these—the ‘emergent’ towns and cities—generally have lower building and 
population densities than older, established urban settlements with accumulated trunk 
infrastructure and therefore may contribute significantly to urban expansion, alongside the 
enlargement of existing urban boundaries. 
 
3.2 Migration and urbanization 
While rural-urban migration is probably not the main contributor to overall urban 
population growth in Nigeria, it nevertheless plays an important role in urban change 
processes, particularly with regard to urbanization – i.e. an increase in proportion of the 
national population residing in urban areas. When viewed over the long run, the net transfer 
of people from rural to urban settlements has been a key driver urbanization. Due to a lack 
of reliable, time-series data we do not have a clear picture of the extent and patterns of rural-
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urban migration within Nigeria. However, by piecing together the available information and 
combining it with what is generally known about migration in the region, we can identify 
some broad trends and dynamics, and dispel some myths. 
First, it should be noted that there are four discernible types of migration flows in Nigeria: 
rural-rural, rural-urban, urban-rural and urban-urban (Oyeniyi 2013). According to data 
from the 1993 Migration and Urbanization Survey of Nigeria, rural-rural migration at the 
time accounted for 63 percent of migrant flows in the country while rural-urban migration 
accounted for just 37 percent (Mberu 2005). However, data from the National Population 
Commission’s 2010 Internal Migration Survey (IMS) indicate an inverse pattern, with rural-
urban migrants now constituting 60 percent of all flows and rural-rural migrants making 
up 40 percent. A separate World Bank study found that rural-urban migration accounts for 
83 percent of migrant flows (McKay and Deshingkar 2014, 12). The reasons for this shift 
have not been explored, but may relate to both demographic and economic trends, which 
have a significant influence on migration volume (Fox 2012; Mberu 2005). As Figure 3 
shows, Nigeria was in the midst of a protracted economic downturn in the early 1990s, and 
population growth was slowing; around the turn of the millennium both trends were 
reversed, with  both population growth and economic growth picking up pace.  
 
Figure 3. GDP per capita and rate of natural population increase, 1980-2013 
 
The NPC migration survey data also show wide variation in patterns of migrant flows across 
states in Nigeria, with the highest rates of rural-urban flows reported in states within the 
South-western, South-eastern and Central conurbation zones as identified above. Rural-
rural migration is reported as the dominant flow in 12 of Nigeria’s 36 states.  
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Unfortunately, there is insufficient data available to determine the absolute volume of 
migrant flows, the distribution of flows across state boundaries, and the volume of urban-
rural and urban-urban flows, both of which are important in shaping urban growth, 
expansion and population distribution. For example, urban-rural flows can offset rural-
urban ones and have done so in many African countries in the past (Mberu 2005; Potts 
2012). Similarly, urban-urban flows can significantly influence urban systems change. 
Indeed, when it comes to understanding growth and expansion trends at the individual 
settlement level, urban-urban migration may in some cases play a dominant role. The 
growth of Abuja (and hence its ascendance in Nigeria’s urban hierarchy) is a case in point: 
the city has grown rapidly primarily due to intensive in-migration after the relocation of the 
capital, with many (if not most) migrants likely to have arrived from other Nigerian towns 
and cities rather than the surrounding countryside. 
 
According to data from the Nigerian 2010 IMS cited by Oyeniyi (2013), the most common 
reasons for men to migrate are to seek employment (24.1 percent) and to further education 
(15.7 percent), while for women the most commonly cited reasons were to join a spouse or 
marry (39.8 percent), to further education (10.9 percent) and to seek employment (10.6 
percent). Other reasons included joining relatives, work transfers, apprenticeships, 
‘adventure’ and escape from conflict (Oyeniyi 2013). Although these figures relate to all 
migrants surveyed (not just those who moved from rural to urban areas), they are generally 
consistent with the extensive research on the determinants of rural-urban migration 
(Byerlee 1974; Todaro 1980; Lucas 1997; de Brauw, Mueller and Lee 2014). In sum, people 
move voluntarily in search of (perceived or actual) opportunity or to escape an undesirable 
situation. It is notable, however, that the evidence suggests that the search for employment, 
which is assumed to be the key determinant of migration in neoclassical economic models, 
accounts for a small fraction of stated motivations for migration for both men and women 
in Nigeria. 
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Moreover, there is some evidence that the wage gap between rural and urban areas, which 
economists often rely upon to estimate the likelihood of rural-urban migration, is not 
particularly wide in Nigeria. Data from 2003 indicate that the urban-rural wage ratio in 
Nigeria was 1.36 in the formal sector and 1.49 in the informal sector (de Brauw, Mueller and 
Lee 2014, Table 1). This is not particularly high by regional standards for SSA and may help 
to account for apparently modest overall migrant flows between rural and urban areas in 
the country. By comparison, the same data set indicates that the urban-rural wage ratio in 
the informal sector is over 2 in Ethiopia, Kenya, Togo and Uganda and over 3 in Zambia. 
 
There is also some information on who is most likely to migrate voluntarily from extensive 
research on rural-urban migration propensities in developing countries: young people who 
are relatively well-educated, often with social connections in the target destination 
(Mendola 2012). Research on the characteristics of migrants in Nigeria specifically have 
been consistent with these broader findings in the empirical literature (Mberu 2005). 
Education level, in particular, is highly correlated with the propensity to migrate from rural 
to urban areas in Nigeria (ibid). 
 
It also appears that the gender balance of the migrant population has equilibrated: 
historically men have been significantly more likely than women to migrate, but data from 
both the 2010 IMS and 1993 Migration and Urbanization Survey show no significant 
difference in migration propensities between men and women (Oyeniyi 2013; Mberu 2005).  
 
Finally, past research in Nigeria has shown differential migration propensities across ethno-
linguistic and religious communities. In general, Christians are more likely to migrate than 
Muslims, with members of the Hausa/Fulani communities in the north found to be least 
likely to migrate to urban areas (Mberu 2005). Data from the 2010 IMS are consistent with 
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these past findings, indicating that rural-urban migration is more common in the South 
West, South East and around the Abuja FCT than in the northern regions. 
 
These findings challenge some current perceptions of migration patterns in the country. For 
example, a 2014 paper from the DFID-funded Migrating out of Poverty project makes the 
following statements: 
 
Poverty levels are comparatively higher in northern regions of the country, which 
are thought to be the primary source areas for migration…Families in the northwest 
and the northeast are four times more likely to have no education than those in the 
south (McKay and Deshingkar 2014, 11-12). 
 
This passage, which reflects the common misperceptions about drivers of rural-urban 
migration noted above, is based on assumptions rather than actual evidence. Given what we 
know about voluntary migrant selectivity in general and in Nigeria in particular, it is 
unlikely that poor, relatively uneducated individuals from the predominantly Hausa north 
of Nigeria will contribute disproportionately to rural-urban migration flows—unless 
communities face forced displacement. Indeed, while the authors may overstate the 
significance of household poverty as a direct stimulus for migration, conflict-induced forced 
migration has had a significant impact on migration in Northern Nigeria. 
 
In the North East region conflict has resulted in large-scale population displacement: 
according to a recent International Organization for Migration report nearly 2 million 
people have been displaced, with 92% being hosted in low-income communities in the 
wider region. Borno state has been most severely affected, followed by Adamawa, Yobe and 
Gombe (IOM 2016). The scale of displacement is straining resources and services in these 
regions.  
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While much of this conflict in recent years has been associated with the Boko Haram 
insurgency, there is a potentially more significant and persistent problem of conflict over 
resources in the region that some have linked to environmental change (Obioha 2008). 
Indeed, there is evidence that changes in rainfall associated with climate change have 
accelerated urbanization in Africa (Barrios, Bertinelli and Strobl 2006) and there was a 
significant decline in rainfall in Nigeria in the second half of the 20th century, with northern 
areas most significantly affected (see Oguntunde, Abiodun and Lischeid 2011; Ogungbenro 
and Morakinyo 2014). Conflict and environmental change may therefore play an important 
role in driving migration for years to come. 
 
In sum, given current trends there is a very high likelihood that Nigeria’s urban population 
will continue to expand rapidly in coming years and constitute an increasing share of the 
national population. After a period of decline the rate of population increase has reached 
pre-1980 levels due to falling mortality and persistently high fertility, particularly in the 
North (see Figure 4). Population growth will naturally contribute to the expansion of 
Nigeria’s urban population, and as noted above there are many positive and negative forces 
that will continue to stimulate rural-urban migration. 
 
Figure 4. Total Fertility Rates by State in 2013 
 
4. Conclusion 
The claim that urbanization in Nigeria has stalled was based on flawed data and a 
problematic hypothesis. Potts (2012) relied on a draft of the Africapolis data that was 
incomplete; the final published figures clearly undermine the stalled urbanization 
hypothesis. This much is clear. But it is also important to recognize the fundamental flaws 
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in this hypothesis in the first place, because it reflects a long-standing misconception about 
urbanization as a process. 
 
Potts (2012) argues that ‘settlements should be defined as urban only if most of their 
residents derive the majority of their livelihoods from non-rural occupations’ (1382). From 
this premise, population data are assumed to reflect economic trends, which the author 
claims are not in favour of rural-urban migration due to ‘high levels of economic 
uncertainty’ for people living in urban areas (1389). 
 
This conceptualisation of urbanization as a strictly economic process is flawed. As decades 
of migration research has shown, including research in Nigeria, people migrate for many 
reasons; employment opportunities are but one such reason. Therefore we cannot make 
reliable inferences about economic conditions by examining inferred migration trends from 
questionable population data. Moreover, it isn’t clear why we should continue to 
conceptualise urbanization as solely or primarily an economic process in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Such a perspective should be balanced with an appreciation of the demographic 
forces driving the process, as well as the demographic dimensions of the very concept of 
urbanism. 
 
A growing body of evidence suggests that declining mortality in a context of persistently 
high fertility is a sufficient condition for urbanization to occur independent of structural 
economic change. Nigeria’s experience appears to further confirm this evidence. Economic 
booms and busts surely influence migration patterns, but history suggests that urbanization 
will persist once mortality rates fall far enough, regardless of economic trends. 
 
Potts (2012) also questions whether or not rural transformation ‘is meaningful in terms of 
a structural understanding of urbanization’ (1383). If one begins from the premise that 
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urbanization should be defined by principally by economic structure, then this statement is 
justified. But there are good reasons to adopt a spatial-demographic concept of urbanism: 
large, dense concentrations of people have distinct requirements that set them apart from 
rural settlements regardless of their employment profile, such as sewerage networks, large-
scale water distribution and mass transport systems. As such a spatial-demographic 
definition of ‘urban’ is appropriate—at least for public policy purposes, which is 
presumably the purpose of tracking changes in human settlement patterns. Large human 
settlements that emerge in previously rural landscapes should certainly be classified as 
urban from this perspective. 
 
In sum, in a context of high fertility, declining mortality, conflict and changes in rainfall 
patterns, it is very likely that Nigerian towns and cities will continue to grow and house an 
increasing share of the national population in the years ahead. 
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Figure 2. People per square kilometre in 2014 & emergent urban fields 
 
Figure 2. Trends in fertility and mortality by urban and rural residence 
 
32 
 
 
Figure 3. GDP per capita and rate of natural population increase, 1980-2013 
 
 
Figure 4. Total Fertility Rates by State in 2013 
 
